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# EASTERN

F.O.  
371

1947

PALESTINE

File No. 46

pp. 9736 - 9977

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References: **FO 371 / 61792**

**CLOSED  
UNTIL**

1978

61792



645

E

E 9736

20 OCT

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9736/21/31

FROM

F.O.

No.

Minute

Dated

P. H. King

Received in Registry

13 Oct  
20 -

Attendance of Belgian Ambassador at the Annual Remembrance Day Parade of the Association of Secret Ex-Servicemen.

The Ambassador has been invited to attend the Parade. He is quite prepared to do so but would like the early view of the Foreign Office.

Last Paper

9722

(Minutes.)

References

SA Dept. Gen. 24/6

JB Oct. 21

*[Signature]*  
24/4

(Print)

(How disposed of)

61792

(Action completed)

J.C. 27/10

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
28/1/48

Next Paper

9766

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4

Minutes.

from attending on political grounds.  
He will no doubt judge the  
Case on its merits and in the  
light of his engagements.

Treaty Dept. may  
have obs.

J. S. Beint  
8th. 15

Treaty Dept. can see  
no objection.

Have since spoken to  
Brazilian Embassy + it appears  
that the Ambassador will decline.

PKR  
16/10.

RECORDED  
1000-1047  
10/10/15

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61792

Palestine  
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11b  
 31  
 E9466 / 46 / C  
 New York  
 2956  
 Dated 17 Oct  
 Received 20 Oct

U.S. policy in Palestine

Last Paper.  
E9422

(Minutes.)

References.

It is surprising, if U.S. policy is that of Mr Marshall, that it is not more realistic. Nothing definite emerges from Mr Johnson's four points: indeed I do not understand the last sentence of (D) at all.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)  
being copied

At the moment we have the initiative and our two statements have ~~been quite~~ <sup>been quite</sup> clear. We should be able to maintain ~~the initiative~~ <sup>the initiative</sup> when our plans for withdrawal are cut and dried.

(Action completed.) 2F 24/10	(Index.) MJA
---------------------------------	-----------------

Next Paper.

J.S. Beins  
 Oct. 20  
 (BEITH)  
 P. J. J. J.  
 21/x  
 BAB  
 20. x

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 9766

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 2956 D. 4.45 p.m. 17th October, 1947  
17th October, 1947 R. 12.40 a.m. 18th October, 1947

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET AND PERSONAL

Following from Secretary of State for Colonies.

Points made to me by Herschel Johnson in recent conversations on Palestine were:-

- (A) United States policy was largely that of Marshall.
- (B) Any scheme must be not a United States scheme but a United Nations scheme.
- (C) He was anxious that neither vacuum nor chaos should occur when Britain withdrew but orderly transfer to United Nations authority, though he appreciated importance of parties being forced up against need for accommodation if dire consequences were to be avoided.
- (D) He may not be altogether in agreement with us as to our position under the mandate, but appreciated and understood our situation and our desire for early withdrawal. He realised that United Nations may not be as quick to find substitute as we would like, but stressed that every effort should be made. He wanted the situation prepared as quickly as practicable when control passes into other hands.

2. In conversation with Silver on October 17th I learnt that he was concerned that the difficulties of implementation and withdrawal should not be disproportionately represented. I told him that assumption underlying American statement was not one we would work on, that some accommodation between the parties was essential, and that while a well-planned substitute central authority in Palestine was essential too much reliance should not be placed on its creation and implementation. He urged friendliness with Britain.

Please pass copy to Colonial Office.

[Ends]

[Copies sent to the Colonial Office]

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E 9779

1947

PALESTINE

20 OCT

Registry Number

E 9779/46/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M. Nardas  
Damascus

Dated

Received in Registry

1258  
20 Oct  
20 -

Arrest of Five Armed Jews by Syrians  
Syrian White of reports informant that five  
armed Jews claiming to be auxiliary police but  
possessing no identification papers were arrested  
by Syrian Patrol one and a half miles inside  
Syrian frontier near British British  
Inspector of Police in answering to identity  
same  
ADDRESSED JERUSALEM 82

Last Paper.

9766

(Minutes.)

By the Hon. Mr. (Walker)

References.

20/10

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

9, Walker. 60  
✓ Oct-22  
(on E9705/951/31)  
8) Palestine Regy. C.O.  
(Church House)  
(under E9558/46/31)  
✓ Oct. 23

(Action completed.)

J.C.M. 29/10

(Index.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

E 9782

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CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.8

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Dundas. D: 12.52 p.m. 20th October, 1947.  
No. 82.  
20th October, 1947. R: 2.15 p.m. 20th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Foreign Office No. 458.

E 9779

IMMEDIATE

Syrian Minister of Defence last night ~~001~~ ~~001~~ me that five armed Jews claiming to be auxiliary police but possessing no identification papers were arrested yesterday evening by a Syrian patrol one and a half kilometres inside the Syrian frontier near Banias. I have been in touch with A.D.C. S.A.F.A.D. and a British inspector of police is coming to Damascus to-day to identify the five.

2. Minister of Defence has kept me fully informed and appears to be most reasonable but has requested that any members of Palestine security forces who may have legitimate occasion to cross the Syrian frontier should be provided with unmistakable identity papers.

20 OCT 1947

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CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Dundas. D: 12.52 p.m. 20th October, 1947.  
No. 32.  
20th October, 1947. R: 2.15 p.m. 20th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Foreign Office No. 458.

IMMEDIATE

Syrian Minister of Defence last night told me that five armed Jews claiming to be auxiliary police but possessing no identification papers were arrested yesterday evening by a Syrian patrol one and a half kilometres inside the Syrian frontier near Banias. I have been in touch with A.D.C. S.A.F.A.D. and a British inspector of police is coming to Damascus to-day to identify the five.

2. Minister of Defence has kept me fully informed and appears to be most reasonable but has requested that any members of Palestine security forces who may have legitimate occasion to cross the Syrian frontier should be provided with unmistakable identity papers.

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E 9831

22 OCT

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number E 9831/46/31  
 FROM O. Hauer  
 No. 89, Inslow  
 Dated Gdas  
 Received in Registry Kensington  
 18 Oct  
 22 -

Fetters of Palestine.  
 Refer previous correspondence (E 2206/4/31/46)  
 Transmits memorandum re future property  
 of Palestine, re mining for potash  
 fertilisers etc.

Last Paper

9782

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

ack Oct 31

86, 80. Oct 30

(Minutes.)

copy to C.O.

I notice that we have acknowledged  
 his previous letters, so we had better  
 acknowledge this one as well.

~~Submit draft.~~

E.R. DeF...

M.E. ... Transfer to Co.

is better, I think

I have agreed this with C.O.

*[Signature]*  
 C.S.E. CABLER

28/10 JB out. 28

(Action completed)

PP 10/12

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
21/11/48

Next Paper

E 9849

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Telephone Number: Kensington 6520

IMPORTANT  
and  
URGENT.

----- 18th October, 1947

To:-The Rt.Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
The Foreign Office,  
Downing Street, London S.W.1

E 9831  
22 OCT

Sir,

The Palestine resources - a proposition for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

In view of the apparent intention of His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine, I would urge you, in the interests of the peoples of Palestine, of our own Empire and of the world-at-large, to consider favourably and to take advantage of the position which now exists as regards the Palestine Government and myself concerning their long-standing offer to me of rights under the Mining Laws to explore for and develop the mineral resources in certain defined areas in Palestine. These areas cover some 4,000 sq.kilometres of land to the South West and South of the Dead Sea.

I am legally entitled to corresponding rights over a similar area in Transjordan, but I am not including this subject in my present communication.

If these exploration and development rights in Palestine, which are still available to me, are secured by Great Britain, they will, under International Law, provide Great Britain with the master-key to the opening up of what is probably the greatest storehouse of potash fertiliser minerals and of magnesium and other minerals vitally essential to agriculture and industry. This storehouse, which is of colossal potential value, is also shared by Transjordan, as part of it lies at depth in both countries.

2. This offer, which was first made to me by the Palestine Government in January 1933, was in respect of all minerals, including oil. But, following the representations of certain international oil interests, the British Government, in 1934, intervened to cause the exploratory operations in Palestine and Transjordan to be held up indefinitely. In 1936, the offer was narrowed down to exclude therefrom the right to search for oil to which I had become legally entitled in 1934.

After due consideration, I agreed to accept the 1936 offer without prejudice to the oil-position which I had already established. But, the Arab Strike had already begun in April 1936, and in consequence of the disturbed state of the Country resulting from that Strike and from the subsequent Arab Revolution, exploration was again held up as field-work could not be undertaken with safety. In 1938, special oil-mining legislation was enacted by which, no matter what happened, certain International Groups would control the exploitation of the Palestine oilfield.

The Palestine Government then re-affirmed its offer to me, but the Country remained unsafe for field-work up to the outbreak of the Second World War. During that War, His Majesty's Government informed me that it had vetoed exploratory work in Palestine and Transjordan for the War period.

In the autumn of 1945, i.e. after the end of the <sup>World</sup> War,  
/the offer

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To:- The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.,

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18th October, 1947

the offer was again renewed by the Palestine Government, but, the widespread campaign of post-war Jewish Terrorist activities which was then launched, caused the proposed exploration, once again, to be postponed.

3. Great Britain is desperately in need of an increase in her food production. Furthermore, owing to the economic chaos following the ravages of war, the whole world must re-establish its agriculture on a sound basis.

For this purpose, increasingly large amounts of Potash ~~for~~ fertilisers will be widely needed. But these are not forthcoming even to the extent available in pre-war days.

Long before the 1914 War, Germany had established a Monopoly of the production of Potash Salts. Although this Monopoly ~~broken~~<sup>was</sup> broken by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany, through Cartel Agreements, soon ~~was~~ re-established her control of the world's production of and markets for potash salts. In 1939, the world's supplies of potash fertilisers came mainly from ~~the~~ European sources, the output, prices and quotas in the markets being regulated by a German-controlled European Potash Cartel: the bulk of the potash sold in the world's markets came from the German Potash Mines.

During the Second World War supplies of potash fertilisers were scanty, and since the end of that War, the amounts available from the European sources do not reach pre-war level. For, the Alsatian and Polish Potash Mines were deliberately sabotaged during the withdrawal of the German Armies of occupation, and although the German Potash Mines fell into the Allies' hands in good working order, only a small part of their output is now available to Great Britain and the outside world, as at least 60 per cent of the German Potash Mining area is in the hands of Russia.

Fresh sources of supply of potash salts and fertilisers have become an urgent necessity. The time is therefore ripe for the foundation of a Potash Mining Industry in Palestine based, as in Germany, upon the mining of the subterranean deposits of potash and magnesium minerals (carnallite) which are widely dispersed throughout the land. In point of fact, these deposits in Palestine (and Transjordan) could enable a potash industry to be built up in these lands with a producing power greater than that of ~~the~~ German Potash Syndicate.

4. The subterranean deposits of mineralised chemicals, etc., which occur in Palestine and Transjordan, are far greater in extent than those which occur in the Potash Mining areas of Germany and of other countries. Moreover, as in the German potash areas, oil deposits are also to be found at depths below the potash-bearing strata.

German and other scientists have long known of the existence of these deposits which have been deliberately kept fallow in the commercial interests of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, of the ~~German~~ Potash Syndicate and of certain international oil combines ( vide Section VII of the enclosed memorandum )

My first approach to the British Government on these matters was made in 1917-1918 when there was a war-shortage of oil and of potash fertilisers. After the Government's own

/appointed

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To:-The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin,M.P.,P.C.,

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18th October, 1947

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appointed experts had reported favourably upon my findings, steps were taken to set my proposals in motion in the autumn of 1918. But, influences were already at work to decry the potential value of these resources, and to deny ~~such~~ their existence, and to delay or block the systematic exploration and test-drilling of the land.

Apparently, so long as the British Government was in control of Palestine, the disclosure and exploitation of the vast resources at depth below its soil did not suit the policies of the above-mentioned international interests.

In consequence, official attention was directed merely to the extraction of salts from the waters of the Dead Sea, and the subterranean deposits of oil and minerals were ignored. After a delay of twelve years, a Company was given rights to exploit the waters of the Dead Sea- with certain reservations. But, owing to the terms of the concession, this Company could not become a competitor of the German Potash Syndicate in the World's markets, nor could it affect the Oil position.

As a matter of fact, in 1936, this Dead Sea Company (Palestine Potash Ltd.) became associated with the German-controlled European Potash Cartel, and its output by the time of the outbreak of War in September 1939, was still only a fraction of that needed by Great Britain. But, even if this Company were now free from the Cartel Agreements by which the German Potash Syndicate controlled its prices, output and quotas on the markets, for technical reasons, and by virtue of the limitations limited scope of its activities, it could never produce potash on a scale adequate to meet the needs of Great Britain, let alone those of the British Empire and of the awakening Far and Middle East. This end can only be achieved by a Potash Mining Industry established in accordance with the provisions of the Palestine Mining Laws.

In this connexion, it is interesting to note that the offer which was made to me in 1933 regarding rights to explore for and develop the oil and mineral resources of Palestine under the Mining Laws over a large area, was consequent upon the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Concessions by the then Shah of Persia in December 1932\* - an event which caused grave anxiety about our oil-position in the Near and Middle East.

But when the position in Persia was re-adjusted in the early months of 1933, official delays again served to block the search for oil in Palestine. In fact, it is perhaps significant that test-drilling for oil in a region which was favourably reported upon in 1934 by experts of the company concerned, has been started in earnest now that Great Britain has decided to surrender the Mandate and withdraw from Palestine !

5. I would say that, throughout all these years, I have held fast to my position as I have always hoped that His Majesty's Government would, eventually, form a Chartered Company for the development of these truly colossal resources of Palestine (and Transjordan) in order to promote the welfare of the peoples of these countries, and to enable the world-at-large to have access to and to share these vitally essential commodities. Such action would be an asset of the greatest value to the British Commonwealth of Nations which needs unrestricted access to sources  
/ of potash fertilisers

\* (or at the end of November 1932.)

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To:- The Rt.Hon.Ernest Bevin, M.P., P.C.

of potash fertiliser minerals and of magnesium and other minerals in order to maintain its independence of alien-controlled cartels.

The position regarding the deposits of mineral resources in Palestine, to which I would now draw your attention, is similar to that which preceded the British development of the Persian oilfields.

You may recall that it was due to the foresight of the late Mr.Pretyman, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, that the British Government availed itself of the opportunity afforded by the rights granted to Mr.D'Arcy, by the then Shah of Persia, to secure the Persian oilfields for the use of Great Britain, and to enable the British Government to acquire a controlling-interest in their development. It is known that, but for the initiative of Mr.Pretyman, this oilfield would have gone into the hands of an alien power.

The utilisation of the rights offered to me by the Palestine Government would enable the British Government to secure a substantial share in the real development of the resources of Palestine, and would safeguard her agriculture from an alien control of essential supplies of potash fertilisers.

In the past, Germany controlled these commodities: to-day, it is no secret that American finance is making large-scale plans to gain possession of and to exploit the veritable treasurehouse which exists in Palestine and Transjordan.

If, therefore, Great Britain loses the opportunity which my position affords, and the U.S.A. should gain monopolistic control of these illimitable resources, the American Chemical Industry, built up since 1914, would be able to dominate the world's chemical and fertiliser industries and markets as did the I.G.Farbenindustrie and the German Potash Syndicate before 1939.

Such a situation would seriously affect the position of the British Chemical Industry in the world's markets.

6. For your personal information, I would say that, some fifteen years ago, when I had occasion to discuss the matter of the Palestine deposits with Lord Ma. Gowan of the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., he expressed the opinion that it should be taken up by the British Government. Possibly this attitude was due to the fact that, in those days, the I.C.I. was not a free agent, owing to its association with the I.G.Farbenindustrie, and the German Potash Syndicate, etc., in cartel agreements.

If the stranglehold of German interests upon American ~~and~~ British, and other chemical industries was really broken by the defeat of Germany, it is possible that Lord McGowan might welcome the opportunity of aiding the British Government in the proposals which I have put before you, and which present opportunities for aiding the world infinitely beyond the powers of the present Palestine Potash Company Ltd.

Should you wish for further details, I shall be happy to call upon you at any time that may be convenient to you.

I have the honour to be,  
Your obedient servant,

*A. Homer.*

(A.Homer) M.A., Sc.D., FR.I.C.  
etc.

Enclosure:- A copy of my Memorandum on the Future of Palestine for your easy reference. A copy was sent to you on the 6th of March, 1946.

*M.*

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at Haifa, a harbour of importance to naval strategy, which could also serve as a point of debouchment for the Oil which was to be brought from the Mosul Oilfields by pipe-line to the West; it was on the air routes for the products of the awakening hinterlands of the Middle East in which huge oilfields were being disclosed. Palestine had, in fact, become a land with an economic future, worth the risk of capital expenditure on its regeneration and westernisation.

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 served as an impetus for the migration to Palestine of large numbers of Jews, mainly from Eastern Europe and from Russia. The movement was well supplied with funds, provided not only by ardent Zionists, but also by non-Zionists, some of whom openly regarded the Zionist Movement as a means to an end. Agricultural colonies were established with the means at their disposal to apply modern methods of scientific farming, and of agricultural engineering, to the problems of restoring productivity to the soil, and providing food and employment for the Jewish settlers. Towns and villages were also built, and a stream of immigrants, of which large numbers were city dwellers, flowed into Palestine before the country was in a position to absorb them. By 1939, their numbers had reached some 500,000, in spite of the fact that Commissions of Enquiry had recommended that the influx of immigrants should be regulated by the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

\*  
a BLUE  
BOOK  
in  
1938  
and

In consequence of the increasing state of tension as between Arabs, Jews and the Administration, His Majesty's Government issued a White Paper in 1939 embodying proposals for the partitioning of Palestine, and placing certain restrictions upon Jewish immigration.

As an aftermath of the Second World War, large numbers of Jews wish to migrate from the War-shattered zones of Europe. Notwithstanding the hostility of the Arab peoples, there are to-day, persistent demands for the immediate absorption of great numbers of Jews into Palestine. To accommodate them, proposals are afoot for reclaiming large tracts of land in Palestine, which are now desolate, and, in the near future, to settle thereon some 4,000,000 Jews, the ultimate aim being to increase the numbers to 15,000,000 or even 20,000,000, which some authorities consider to be the absorptive capacity of Greater Palestine.

Moreover, it is claimed in certain quarters that, as a result of planned improvements, Palestinian agriculture will eventually provide food for the millions of immigrants in view, and will play an important part in converting Palestine into a prosperous and thriving community.

## II. THE PATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF PALESTINE.

For economic reasons, however, the path to the future prosperity of Palestine lies in the foundation of industries based upon the vast natural resources of the country, which, if effectively developed, would make of Palestine one of the world's most important industrial centres. It does not lie in costly schemes for the reclamation and regeneration of agricultural land which has suffered from centuries of neglect. For, the capital cost of such regeneration would adversely affect the /economic export

\* Omitted by mistake from the text of the original manuscript.

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economic export of agricultural products, and hamper trade barter.

Experience has shown that an industrialised country can attain a higher degree of prosperity and culture than it is possible for an agricultural community to achieve. In fact, a country whose soil is incapable of producing economically even one-half of the food it requires, can become exceedingly prosperous if its terrain is rich in natural resources essential to modern civilisation, and if those resources are effectively exploited and used as source materials for industries.

This generalisation is particularly applicable to Palestine and Transjordan, which contain vast resources of raw materials, from which can be produced KEY SUBSTANCES of vital importance to industry and commerce in times of peace and war.

### III. THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF PALESTINE.

For centuries past, Palestine and Transjordan have been considered of no economic importance, all interest in them being confined to their religious, historical and archaeological significance.

But, all unsuspected, these lands, from time immemorial, have guarded one of the world's most extensive storehouses of Oil and Mineral wealth, of which, as scientists now recognise, the phenomena of the Dead Sea Region, of the Dead Sea itself, and of the Ghor, are but surface indications.

For some thousands of years, mankind has observed many of these phenomena without sensing their import as to what lay hidden at depth below the surface of these lands. Indeed, familiar though countless millions are with the story, few people, even in these scientific times, realise that the cataclysm responsible for the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and the fate of Lot's Wife, provide visible clues as to the existence of subterranean deposits of colossal value.

The natural resources of these countries are greater in extent than those upon which Germany was able to build up huge chemical industries which enabled her to gain monopolistic powers in the world's markets in preparation for her bid for World Domination.

It is just over a hundred years ago since scientific interest was aroused in these regions. Thereafter, exploratory expeditions were sent out under the auspices of the governments of America, Britain, Egypt, France and Turkey; of various organisations, of Oil and Chemical interests; and of private persons. A wealth of valuable information was gleaned and put on record in official reports, in scientific journals, and in private documents available to a privileged few.

The following minerals are to be found in various localities in Palestine and Transjordan:-

Limestone, Dolomite, and phosphate-bearing rocks of very high grade:  
Alaunite, Gypsum, Rock-Salt, Carnallite:  
Sulphur, Selenium, Tellurium:  
Titaniferous, Manganiferous and Chromium Oxide Iron Ores:  
Ores containing Copper, Silver, Lead, Antimony, Nickel:  
Tungsten and Thorium compounds:

/Alluvial deposits

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Alluvial deposits containing valuable constituents:  
Gold, Turquoises and precious stones:

Radio-active elements, to which is due the radio-activity of the waters of the Dead Sea and of the thermal springs which are a feature of these countries.

It is also on record that other localities near the Dead Sea are rich in minerals, and should be fully investigated.

IV. COLOSSAL POTENTIAL WEALTH OF THE PALESTINE RESOURCES.

The colossal potential wealth of the natural resources of Palestine and Transjordan can be gauged from the composition of two surface features, namely, Djebel Usdom (the "Mountain of Salt") and the Dead Sea.

According to a former Geological Adviser to the Palestine Government, the late Mr G.S. Blake, there are some 1,000,000,000 tons of Rock Salt exposed in Djebel Usdom. This mineralised deposit is considered to have been thrust upwards from lower strata during the cataclysm which changed the configuration of the Southern End of the Dead Sea.

The Dead Sea itself is now some fifty miles long and ten miles wide, but, in geological time, it was 250 miles long and 50 miles wide. Its salinity has been famed from antiquity. According to an official report published by the Crown Agents for the Colonies in 1925, there are in solution in the Dead Sea some 22,000,000,000 tons of magnesium chloride, 11,900,000,000 tons of common salt, 2,000,000,000 tons of potassium chloride, and 980,000,000 tons of Bromine as Bromide.

The potential wealth of the salts in solution in the Dead Sea, at pre-war market values, was thus of the order of £200,000,000,000.

The Dead Sea also contains GOLD in solution, its pre-war value according to the calculations of Professor Claude, a famous French Scientist, being some £10,000,000,000, of which he considered some £3,000,000,000 could be profitably extracted therefrom within a period of fifteen years. My own more conservative estimate of the value of the Gold was of £5,000,000,000.

The above figures, astounding though they may be, represent but a fraction of the subterranean treasures which exist in Palestine and Transjordan, and of which these and other phenomena are but surface indications of their widespread distribution. In actuality, deposits of mineralised salts have been detected not only in the El Lisan-Djebel Usdom region of the Dead Sea area, but also in several places along the Jordan-Arabah-Akabah alignment, in the uplands, and even in the maritime plain. Moreover, the widespread distribution of subterranean salt-bearing strata is no secret to those who, officially or privately, have drilled for water in various parts of Palestine. In many localities, the search for underground sources of water for irrigation, or for drinking purposes, has been fruitless because of its salinity, or of the presence of Oil or Salt-bearing strata at depth.

As a matter of fact, Palestine and Transjordan have a

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still further source of wealth in the extensive Oilfields which have long been known to exist therein. Geologists and Oil Technologists consider these Oilfields to be of great promise in certain localities, and it only remains for their effective drilling to provide these countries with an added source of wealth.

V. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN TO THE FOUNDATION OF INDUSTRIES IN PALESTINE.

On the face of it, there is ample source material for the foundation of industries of inestimable value to these countries, not only by virtue of income to be derived from royalties and share of profits, but also by the stimulation of trade through the employment of labour of all grades. Thus: -

The initiation of great industries in Palestine, based upon the resources of the countries, will not only provide employment for some thousands of men in the chemical and subsidiary industries, but also in the other industries which will be fostered as the schemes develop. With the expansion of the enterprise, there will follow the construction of roads, railways, and other means of transport; there will be increased shipping to the ports; construction of houses, warehouses, buildings, wharves, and shipping facilities. Automatically, the employment of thousands of workers of all grades, from directors down to labourers, will be followed by a stimulus to all trades or professions engaged in the production of necessities, luxuries, and recreations for the different grades of workers.

There will thus be increased employment and increased revenue to the country from the provision of food, clothes, houses, health (doctors, welfare-centres, etc.), places of worship, amusement, etc. Furthermore, the provision locally of cheap fertilisers will stimulate agriculture, and be a means of restoring fertility to the land - especially so, if certain schemes for irrigation be adopted.

Moreover, these lands are indeed fortunate, in that they contain vast resources of KEY SUBSTANCES, such as OIL, FERTILISER MATERIALS, GOLD, and MAGNESIUM minerals which are essential to present-day civilisation. They also contain RADIO-ACTIVE elements. Furthermore, the physical structure of Palestine is such that there are engineering possibilities for the large-scale production of cheap hydro-electric power needed for industrial purposes, transport, etc.

The path to prosperity thus clearly lies in the effective initiation of industries in Palestine, and proposals to that end were placed before His Majesty's Government by a British Group, of which I was a Member, as soon as the British Armed Forces began to free the regions from Turkish control.

VI. THE PATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF PALESTINE INDICATED IN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES FIRST LAID BEFORE H.M. GOVERNMENT DURING 1917-1918.

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VI. THE PATH TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF PALESTINE INDICATED  
IN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES FIRST LAID BEFORE H.M.  
GOVERNMENT DURING 1917-1918.

During the first World-War, there was an acute shortage of Potash Salts and Fertilisers, as supplies from Germany were unavailable. In preparation for that War, and her bid for World Power, Germany had secured a World Potash Monopoly through the fact that she was the main producer of Potash Salts and Fertilisers, having extensive deposits of Potash and other minerals at depth below her soil, which were mined and processed by the Kali Syndikat, one of the most powerful organisations in the world.

In the course of my War work, I was brought face-to-face with the fact that agriculture was suffering from an acute shortage of potash fertilisers. In order, therefore, if possible, to ease the position, and free the world's farming industry from a continuance of such monopolistic control, and a recurrence of war-time Potash starvation, I made intensive investigations as to the possibility of obtaining access to, and securing the development of another source of Potash minerals.

As a result, I came to the conclusion that in Palestine and Transjordan, there lay fallow what is perhaps the greatest source of Potash in the world, and that, at depth below the Potash-bearing strata, there exists an extensive Oilfield which was awaiting test-drilling. Furthermore, these countries possessed other mineral resources which could form the basis of industries of world-wide importance, provided the Oilfield was developed, and a cheap source of hydro-electric power was made available. Here, again, Nature had provided these countries with the requisite geological and physical formations to meet these requirements.

My findings and proposals regarding such developments were included in a comprehensive scheme for the development of Palestine which was worked out during 1917-1918 (and improved upon later) by a British Group of Civil, Chemical, and Electrical Engineers, with myself as the Scientific Member of the Group. Our schemes included proposals for:-

- (i) The irrigation of the Jordan Valley:
- (ii) The development of a cheap and plentiful supply of hydro-electric power by bringing sea-water from the Mediterranean to the edge of the Jordan Valley, and precipitating it over the cliffs into the Valley (a drop of 700 feet). The sea-water thus employed for power-production was then to be directed down the Jordan Valley into the Dead Sea, which, under the irrigation scheme, would be deprived of the constant inflow of water from the River Jordan.

We also proposed to obtain hydro-electric power from the River Jordan itself, and from the water-fall which is situated in the Wadi Mojeb, some three-quarters of a mile from the Eastern shore of the Dead Sea, as temporary installations for use until the sea-water project could be put into operation:

/(iii) The

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(iii) The development of industries for the production of Potash Fertilisers, Magnesium Metal, Bromine, Gold, Caustic Alkalis, and other chemicals, using as source materials, in the first instance, the brine of the Dead Sea; ultimately, we would use as source materials for many of the industries, the vast deposits of mineral salts which are known to exist, at depth, in various parts of Palestine and Transjordan:

and (iv) The test-drilling and development of the Dead Sea Region, which has long been considered to be the most promising section of the extensive oilfield which exists in these lands. This Oil would be a great asset to Palestine and Transjordan, which need indigenous sources of fuel. It would also be of inestimable service to the proposed industries,

In the summer of 1918, the British Government expressed itself satisfied with our proposals, and offered to furnish a considerable part of the requisite capital, provided a Commission of Experts, whom we were sending to Palestine to carry out surveys and other investigations, including test-drilling in a certain locality for deposits of Oil and Potash minerals, should report favourably upon our findings. But, owing to the imminence of the Armistice, the Foreign Office withheld the necessary passports.

Thereafter, we repeatedly applied for permission to put our scheme of development into effect, but, for one reason or another, we were not allowed to commence our proposed operations.

After the Armistice, the Government seemed uninterested in the importance of our scheme to the economic development of Palestine, a country into which some hundreds of thousands of immigrants have poured since it came under British control, and a country which has become of strategic, political, and commercial significance.

A policy of delay, if not of obstruction, was pursued in dealing with these matters, and our findings were discounted as over-statements of fact, and over-optimistic in outlook. Unfortunately, the technical nature of the facts concerning the Palestine resources and their development limits their circulation to a very small section of the general public. Wherefore, any such interests as might be in opposition to the large-scale development of the Palestine resources have, hitherto, been able to belittle their colossal worth, and have even denied their existence.

As a result of this policy, the development of Palestine has been retarded, and the picture of the country's resources has been distorted. The existence of the Palestine Oilfield and of the vast subterranean deposits of Potash Fertiliser minerals has been kept from public knowledge.

Although some thirty years have elapsed since our comprehensive schemes were first placed before H.M. Government, the proposed large-scale development of OIL, POWER, and FERTILISERS, the extraction of GOLD, and the establishment of Magnesium and other important subsidiary industries, are still in abeyance.

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Attention has been focussed upon (1) the production of hydro-electric power from installations erected in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee and the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Valleys\*\* and (2) the extraction of Potash and other salts from the solar evaporation of Dead Sea Brine††. However, as indicated under (ii) and (iii) above, with our wide knowledge of the resources of the country, we regarded these developments as merely temporary expedients, until ample and cheap hydro-electric power was developed from the sea-water project, and until the subterranean deposits of Potash minerals were mined and processed quickly, as in the German Potash Industry.

From the evidence before me, I am in a position to state that the effective development of Palestine has, hitherto, been blocked or delayed because such developments did not accord with the commercial or political policies of certain Cartels and other powerful international interests.

VII. VESTED INTERESTS versus THE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF KEY INDUSTRIES IN PALESTINE.

Palestine and Transjordan contain what is perhaps one of the greatest sources of mineral wealth in the world. Their resources of OIL, POTASH and GOLD are colossal.

In a Memorandum on the proposed industrial development of the Dead Sea Region which was submitted to the League of Nations in January 1930, I wrote as follows:-

"The commercial exploitation of the mineral resources of the Dead Sea Region is illimitable; and, if kept free from the direct or indirect control of powerful Chemical Cartels and other vested interests that are, naturally, opposed to its unrestricted development, will prove to be perhaps the greatest industrial romance of the world's history."

At that time, few people were aware of the existence of international Cartels, let alone their ramifications and control of prices and production in various industries.

During the recent War, however, considerable publicity was given to the activities of certain International Cartels, which, being in effect German-controlled, were holding up War production on account of their Cartel agreements. Oil and Chemical interests were also implicated, keeping each other informed of discoveries and inventions.

Germany had forged for herself a powerful weapon in her virtual control of the world's Chemical Market. She made it her business to be kept informed of any discoveries of mineral or chemical resources likely to be developed in competition with her industries, and took steps to prevent or control or limit any such developments.

/Germany

\*\* (1) Rutenberg Concession of 1921  
 †† (2) Novitsky Tullon Concession of 1930

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resources, and of profitable Industries in these countries may well have to be abandoned.

In particular, a Potash Mining Industry is essential to remedy the Potash position. The Dead Sea Salts Industry, for technical reasons, will be unable to cope with the acute world shortage of Potash Fertilisers, which will continue for years to come. It is certain that the production of Potash in Europe will be inadequate to meet the export demands. The Alsatian and Polish Potash Mines were deliberately and systematically sabotaged by the Germans in the days of their defeat and withdrawal. The German Potash Mines, however, were captured by the Allies in good working order; but, as about sixty per cent of Germany's Potash Mining Industry is now within the Russian zone of influence, there will be only about thirty per cent of the pre-War German output available for distribution throughout the world.

America, having sought for and developed deposits of Potash mineral salts, is well on its way to become independent of European supplies of Potash. Had the British Government but allowed our proposals of 1918 to have gone forward, there would have been no Potash problem for us to-day, and Palestine and Transjordan would have benefited largely therefrom, and from the exploitation of their Oilfield.

In view of the nature of the Bretton Woods Agreement, H.M. Government may change its policy also in respect of the production of Gold.

Since first I became interested in these matters, it has been my contention that, owing to the significance of the Palestine resources in world politics, their development and utilisation should not be left to commercial interests, but should be under Government control, so that the countries themselves shall benefit adequately therefrom. The presence of Radio-activity, and the use to which radio-active elements have been put in time of War, perhaps calls for such control to be placed under the trusteeship of a United Nations Organisation.

(Signed) A. HOMER, M.A., Sc.D., F.R.I.C., etc.  
89, Onslow Gardens,  
London, S.W. 7.

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<p>NY 4247 31</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>26 EQ849 / G 22 OCT 1947</p>
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EQ849 746/c

Palestine: Discussions  
of Committee.

New York  
2954

Dated 17 Dec  
Received 29 Dec.

Last Paper.  
EQ466

(Minutes.)

Now see EQ856 / G

References.

about 23

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Amended disc.

NOT used

✓ Ted New York 3067  
20 Dec

✓ Ted New York 3553  
18 Dec

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

24/10

NYK

Next Paper.

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AMENDED DISTRIBUTION  
18.10.47.

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2954

D. 4.30 p.m. 17th October, 1947.

17th October, 1947.

R. 11.45 p.m. 17th October, 1947.

Repeated to : High Commissioner, Jerusalem

URGENT

SECRET

Following personal for Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.  
from Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Committee set up by the Assembly to consider the Palestine question has finished its general discussion. Yesterday I again put our views and emphasised our early withdrawal and the importance that the parties should move to some accommodation or the United Nations find a solution. I also emphasised that any scheme adopted must provide for a substitute authority and that the question of implementing and enforcing the scheme must be dealt with as an integral part of the problem. I further explained why the United Kingdom is unable to recommend any particular solution. I repudiated suggestions that the United Kingdom was concerned with provocative measures in the Middle East, warned the governments of connivance in illegal immigration and pleaded that the whole problem of displaced persons in Europe be dealt with. I also replied to the American assumption that United Kingdom would continue to administer Palestine throughout the transition period.

2. We have been well supported by the Commonwealth Governments except that they have urged a settlement on the basis of partition which is the dominant view here.

3. The Arab attitude has remained intransigent and there is no sign here that they are prepared to discuss any accommodation. The Jews appear ready to work out some arrangement with the Arabs and the United Nations on the basis of partition and are anxious to restore better relations with the United Kingdom. Both the Palestine Arabs and Jewish Agency will now make statements. Many resolutions concerning procedure have been tabled and these are being classified and will probably result in the appointment of sub-committees.

(Foreign Office

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(Foreign Office and Colonial Office only.)

4. I feel that the limit of my immediate usefulness over here will be exhausted next week and our experts and advisers can well carry on, certainly during the next stages. If necessary I can return later but meantime our position is well covered, though it would be well for me to inform other delegations of my temporary withdrawal. I would propose therefore to return to England (where many important and urgent matters await me) at the end of next week. I hope I have your consent to this course. [Ends]

Please pass copy to Colonial Office, and repeat paragraphs 1 to 3 to High Commissioner, Jerusalem, personal and Secret from Secretary of State for the Colonies, as my telegram No. 98.

[Copies sent to Parliamentary Undersecretary, Colonial Office, and Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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E9849/46/9.  
THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN  
CIRCULATED TO :

Sir. G. Sargent..... 32

Mr. Werner.....

Mr. M. Wright.....

— Eastern Dept. ....

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Registry  
No.

P.D.

**Draft**  
UK DEL.  
NEW YORK

**Telegram**

No. 3567 ✓  
20 10 47

Cypher

PRISEC.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

Following personal for Secretary  
of State for Colonies from the Prime  
Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2954 [of October 17th:  
Palestine]

We realise that you would like to be  
at home with Parliament resuming and  
appreciate that you do not wish to stay  
on in New York if affairs there do not  
warrant it. <sup>But</sup> We are doubtful whether it  
would be wise <sup>for you</sup> to leave just yet. For  
your own private information indications are  
reaching us here that moves on the Arab side  
may be brewing. If the Jews  
are nervous we think that the Arabs are too.  
These moves may come to something when a  
vote has been taken on the principle. If  
there were a two-thirds majority in favour  
of the partition plan, Arabs and Jews, or  
one of the parties, might appeal to us in  
some way and we might even get a settlement.  
If matters were to work out in this way  
it might well be that we should have some  
suggestions for you to put to the parties  
in New York. Our feeling therefore is that  
you would be well advised not to leave  
New York, at any rate until after a vote  
has been taken on the principle.

2./

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20/10  
Despatched 11.40 a.m.

DEYOU

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2. If you do have to leave, we think that Cadogan with all his experience should take charge of the Palestine question, assuming that Hector has enough on his plate already.

3. We feel sure that you will think it wise to be very cautious in any dealings you have with the Syrian Khouri.

*[Copies sent to Prime Minister]*

*[Signature]*

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3567.

20th October 1947.

D. 11.40 a.m. 20th October 1947.

IMMEDIATE.  
TOP SECRET.  
DEYOU.

Following personal for Secretary of State for the Colonies from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2954 [of October 17th: Palestine].

We realise that you would like to be at home with Parliament resuming and appreciate that you do not wish to stay on in New York if affairs there do not warrant it. But we are doubtful whether it would be wise for you to leave just yet. For your own private information indications are reaching us here that moves on the Arab side may be brewing. If the Jews are nervous we think that the Arabs are too. These moves may come to something when a vote has been taken on the principle. If there were a two-thirds majority in favour of the partition plan, Arabs and Jews, or one of the parties, might appeal to us in some way and we might even get a settlement. If matters were to work out in this way it might well be that we should have some suggestions for you to put to the parties in New York. Our feeling therefore is that you would be well advised not to leave New York at any rate until after a vote has been taken on the principle.

2. If you do have to leave, we think that Cadogan with all his experience should take charge of the Palestine question, assuming that Hector has enough on his plate already.

3. We feel sure that you will think it wise to be very cautious in any dealings you have with the Syrian Khouri.

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Palestine

EASTERN

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E9850 1 46 10<sup>31</sup>

Beirut

Y69

dated 20 Oct

Received 22 Oct.

Palestine: Possible action by  
ex - Mufti

Last Paper.

E9849

References.

E9639/95/31

E9713/49/31

(Minutes.)

Mr Walker

J.S. Bevis  
Oct. 23

There seems to be little doubt that the  
Iraqi Army will at least be prepared for  
intervention in Palestine

M.T. Walker  
(M.T. WALKER) 23/10

(Print.)

Para. 2 conflicts with para. 3 of Amman

lll: no: 306 (attached).

I am inclined to wonder whether, when it comes  
to the point, the Iraqi army will do much in Palestine  
- whether, in fact, they will do more than send a  
token force.

P. Farran  
24/10

BABS  
26.4

(How disposed of.)

20 Oct 1948

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
25 27/10	WJA.

Next Paper.

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

22 OCT 1947

38

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans, D. 5.20 p.m. 20th October, 1947.  
No. 769 R. 7.58 p.m. 20th October, 1947.  
20th October, 1947.

Repeated to New York UKDEL.  
Cairo,  
B.M.E.O. Cairo.  
Jerusalem,  
Bagdad,  
Damascus, )  
Amman, ) SAVING  
Jedda. )

TOP SECRET

Palestine.

Saleh Jabr whom I saw on October 19th said to me that he was confident that the ex-Mufti would not (repeat not) start guerilla activities as long as British forces were in Palestine. I asked him if this would be the case if a decision unfavourable to the Arabs was reached by the United Nations Assembly, saying I had heard rumours to the effect that Arab irregulars might become active in such an eventuality. He replied in the affirmative and said that the ex-Mufti had been warned that if he did not keep in step with the Arab League, the responsibility would be his and that he could not then count on help from the Arab States. It had been agreed that the ex-Mufti's people should press forward with their preparations, but that they should do nothing. Attitude of Azzam Pasha and Riad Bey Solh in this connexion had been correct. He added that he would urge Riad Bey to curtail the ex-Mufti's stay in the Lebanon.

2. Saleh Jabr said that certain Iraqi units were being prepared for "manoeuvres" in Transjordan. Recalling paragraph 3 of Amman telegram No. 306, I asked him whether he had discussed this with King Abdullah. He replied that he had and that His Majesty had been generally in agreement. He reminded me that Iraqi-Transjordan treaty provided for close co-operation in the military field.

3. Speaking for the establishment of provisional Palestinian Government which would be set up under the auspices of the Arab League - please see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 760 - he said that the Jews would be invited to participate on a proportional basis. Arab Governments would do everything possible to protect the Jews with whom they were anxious there should, if possible, be no clash.

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4. Saleh Jabr appeared more cheerful than when I last saw him (after statement of American policy) and he seemed not unhopeful that a sufficient number of States in the United Nations Assembly would either vote against siding U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations or abstain and thus secure their rejection.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York as my telegram No.40, and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.200.

[Repeated to UKDEL New York].

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Cypher OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3003

D. 8.35 p.m. 21st October 1947.

21st October 1947. R. 1.40 p.m. 21st October 1947.

TOP SECRET

Personal from Colonial Secretary for Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

[Begins]

Your telegram No. 3567.

I appreciate your view and will stay as long as seems necessary. I am anxious about Colonial Office affairs including Development Corporation Bill, Ceylon, Governors' Conference, Malaya and other urgent matters but I realise the importance of nothing going amiss at United Nations regarding Palestine. Creech Jones.

[Ends].

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Colonel Rees-Williams, Colonial Office].

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P.D.

*U.K. Delegation*

NEW YORK.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

No.....

Cypher

Date.....

Diplomatic Secret.

Your telegram No.3003 [of October 21st:  
Colonial Secretary and Palestine]

Personal for Colonial Secretary from  
the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

We fully realise what a number of tasks  
are awaiting you at home and how inconvenient  
it is for you to be away. We are not clear  
from your telegrams Nos. 3021 and 3031 when  
the question of principle will come up, but  
gather that matters are not likely to come to a  
head just yet. We therefore feel that you  
should be free to come home whenever you  
judge the moment opportune. You will no  
doubt determine your actual date of departure  
in the light of developments of the Palestine  
situation which you are much better able to  
assess than ourselves.

2. We should like to know whether in  
your absence Cadogan will be in charge of the  
Palestine question.

For concurrence  
of Prime Minister.

*Reed 11.10.42.  
24/x. P.S.*

*P.S.  
Res. Clerk.  
24/10*

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Registry  
No. E9856/46/9

Top Secret.  
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Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

U.K. Delegation

New York

Tel. No. 3654

Cypher  
Oct 25

Dip. Secret

E

25/10  
8 30 PM  
Oct. 1947 HA

Immediate

Dip. Secret

[Tel. to Colonial Sec.  
John P. ...  
of ... 25/10]

My tel. No 3648 [9 Oct 25

Colonial Secretary's return from

New York] per Colonial Sec. from S. G. S.  
Re Minola's State's

message in Delegation tel.

No. 3062 shows that the U.S.  
Govt. may ~~have~~ have something to say on

Palestine through Douglas, who  
has now returned to London.

I feel it would be very  
desirable for me to have  
your assistance at this end.

So I hope that, if you decide you  
can leave, you will be able  
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to return very soon.

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Top Secret

CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3,654.

D: 8.30 p.m. 25th October, 1947.

25th October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

My telegram No. 3,648 [of October 25th: Colonial Secretary's return from New York].

Personal for Colonial Secretary from Secretary of State.

The Minister of State's message in Delegation telegram No. 3,062 shows that the United States Government have something to say on Palestine through Douglas, who has now returned to London. I feel it would be very desirable for me to have your assistance at this end. So I hope that, if you decide you can leave, you will be able to return very soon.

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22 OCT

Registry Number } E9858/46/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. M. Dandaras

Dated Damascus

Received in Registry } 459  
21 Oct  
22

Arrest of five armed Jews by Syrians.  
Rifan Damara - et 82 L Jerusalem (E9779/46/31)  
British Inspector of Police, was prevented by Director,  
General of Police, from seeing arrest of men  
Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior  
both advised that if Jews are identified as  
revolutionary police they will be returned with  
arms over the frontier.  
ADARITSEN JERUSALEM 84

Last Paper.

9856

(Minutes.)

Dr. Benis  
rt. 24

References.

this is all settled now

JB Oct. 28

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wathesien  
CO.  
✓ Oct 23  
3) Palestine Regy C.O.  
(Church House)  
(with E9779/46/31)  
✓ Oct 23

(Action completed.)

GEM 28/10

(Index.)

W. 28/10/48

Next Paper.

E 9864

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1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: FO 371 / 61792



Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

48 E

FROM DAMASCUS TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Dundas  
No. 84  
21st October, 1947

D. 4.02 p.m. 21st October, 1947  
R. 6.35 p.m. 21st October, 1947

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 459

SECRET

My telegram No. 82.

E 9858

British Inspector of Police referred to was prevented by Director-General of Police from seeing ~~22~~ <sup>32</sup> OT men. I saw Ministers of Defence and the Interior last night who both assured me that if the Jews are identified as auxiliary police they will be returned with their arms over the frontier.

2. I have arranged by telephone for another British inspector from Palestine to make identification today.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

888



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6-4

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E 9864 49

23 OCT

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9864/46/31

FROM

6 Lancing

No.

Moscow

Dated

403/108/47

Received in Registry

12 Oct

23 -

*Patented Russian Press  
Refer Moscow despatch 448 (E 5269/46/31)  
Now enclosed further review from 'New Times'  
of Oct. 8 of Bentley's account book 'Behind  
the Scenes' written by  
B. Dandinsky.*

Last Paper

9858

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

*GEM 3/11*

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
*27/7/48*

Next Paper

9868

(Minutes.)

*ca 29/11  
NA Sept. ✓ RAB 4/11  
Northern Sept.*

*Bentley's book is  
just up the Russian alley  
Bost. 24*

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
MOSCOW.

E  
50

(403/108/47)

12th October 1947.

E 9864

Dear Department, 23 OCT

5269/26/31

Moscow despatch No. 448 of June 12th forwarded the translation of a Soviet review of Bartley Cram's book "Behind the Silken Curtain".

-----  
We now enclose a further review from New Times of October 8th which imputes to the State Department and Foreign Office the wilful intention of steering the Committee of Enquiry away from an objective study of all the facts. Cram is given good marks only for his criticism of United States and the Americans, not for his ideas on Palestine.

You will doubtless notice the recurrence in the penultimate paragraph of the theme that Palestine is the battleground where a stubborn fight is being waged between the rival claims of British imperialism and American economic, political and military expansion.

We are sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Washington, Jerusalem and New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

## Behind the Scenes of Anglo-American Co-operation

B. DANILEVSKY

BARTLEY Crum was one of the six American members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. He has now published a book\* recounting the first-hand experience he gained in that capacity of the inner workings of British and American diplomacy. A San Francisco corporation lawyer, Mr. Crum was a close collaborator of President Roosevelt. In the presidential elections of 1944 he was the national chairman of the Independent Republicans who supported Roosevelt. He performed a number of important missions for the late president. In 1945 he was consultant to the American delegation at the San Francisco conference, where he worked on the United Nations Charter.

"When you want to avoid deciding a question, set up a committee," Clemenceau once said. This was the principle on which British Prime Minister Attlee acted when, at the end of 1945, President Truman, deferring to the demands of American Jewry, asked him to allow 100,000 Jewish displaced persons from the camps of Western Europe to enter Palestine. Attlee suggested the formation of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The committee consisted of six Britons and six Americans, of which Bartley C. Crum was one. It inaugurated its inquiries in Washington, continued them in London, visited the British, American and French zones of occupation of Germany, and then transferred its labours to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. It heard the testimony of hundreds of witnesses, experts and representatives of public organizations, and then retreated to Switzerland where in the course of four weeks it worked on the framing of its recommendations.

\* *Behind the Silken Curtain. A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East.* By Bartley C. Crum. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1947.

When Crum first arrived in Washington to take up his work on the committee, he was given an inkling of the line of action expected of him by Loy Henderson, Chief of the Near East Division of the State Department. Henderson took him aside and told him:

"There is one fact facing both the United States and Great Britain, Mr. Crum. That is the Soviet Union. It would be wise to bear that in mind when you consider the Palestine problem." (P. 8.)

Crum was surprised to hear this. But he only began to ponder on it seriously later, when he compared Henderson's broad hint with what representatives of the British Foreign Office insistently tried to impress upon him. And what they impressed upon him was this:

"British policy was based on the protection of British interests against Russia... and it should be in our (America's) interests to fall in with that policy." (P. 8.)

The committee sailed from New York to London on the Queen Elizabeth. On board, Harold Beeley, a member of the British Foreign Office, tried to convince Crum of the necessity to establish an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire in the Middle East. And as the ship neared English shores the proselytizing talks on this subject became ever more lengthy and outspoken. Their general tone is summed up by Crum as follows:

"The majority of my British colleagues were anti-Russian, their attitudes so strong as to be almost a phobia... It was Anglo-American unity they desired, not so much to solve the problem before us, but rather to establish a bloc against the Soviets." (P. 35.)

However, some of the Americans on the committee held a different view:

"We realized, I think, that the Soviet and the system it chose to follow were both in the world and that we had to live with both, like it or not. If we travelled different roads, each still had much to learn from the other. The world was large enough for both, and the market place, not the battlefield, should be the testing place of ideas." (P. 35.)

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tions shall be raised from my side. If due to illness or other reasons I should not be on the spot when the time comes to pay fines and other fees for failure to meet rent payments, all my obligations will be assumed unconditionally by my sponsor Miki Itsiro."

This contract is a striking reflection of the appalling conditions under which the Japanese peasantry labour. From the contract it is clear that the landowner undertakes no obligations whatsoever. If tenant Kawasaki should take ill and die by the time the rent is due landowner Osumi would lose nothing. Sponsor Miki, Kawasaki's neighbour, who is a poor tenant farmer like all the other inhabitants of Hiraoka village, would have to meet the payments.

The landowner has the right to raise the rent and to levy additional payments and fines on the peasants. Crop failures due to drought, typhoons or floods do not concern the landowner. He extorts his land rents from the peasants no matter what happens. Incidentally, the Tokyo district this year has had its worst drought in 80 years. In a number of prefectures as much as half of the rice crop perished.

The landlord charges a percentage for each day of arrears in payment of rentals. At any time of the year he can reclaim the land he has leased. Last, but not least, the landowner has the right to black-list a tenant for irregular payment of rent. This black list is sent out to all the landowners in the prefecture, and the peasants whose names figure on it will not be able to lease any land in that area.

This mode of land tenure which has existed for decades still persists in the Japanese countryside. Moreover, land rents have risen since the war ended. In some cases the rent is as much as 63 per cent of the harvest. A great many Japanese sharecroppers are up to their ears in debt to the landowner for years on end and are to all intents and purposes his slaves.

In any Japanese village you will see fruit trees on tenant farmer's land with the fallen fruit rotting on the ground. We were told that according to local custom the peasant has no right to pick up the fruit without the permission of the landowner. If a peasant leases a plot of land with a small orchard on it he has no right to use the fallen fruit for food until he has paid his rent in full. And in the meantime his family starves.

The evil forces of old that brought immense misery on the country are still ruling the Japanese countryside. An acute food crisis prevails in towns and villages. We visited shops in Tokyo, Yokohama and other cities. The local inhabitants rarely enter them. The shops have neither food products nor other necessities. On the open market, however, speculators offer all kinds of products and articles in unlimited quantities at fabulous prices. One of the black markets flourishes in Ginze Street, one of the busiest Tokyo thoroughfares, where every kind of trade proceeds daily.

The population of Japan is suffering from hunger and want not because the country is unable to produce enough food, but because the policy of the Japanese government hinders democratic reforms which would spur the development of agriculture. Moreover, the government does not take measures to insure the efficient harvesting of the crop and the proper distribution of available food supplies. There are considerable stocks of rice and other products in the country, but these stocks lie buried. They have been hidden by the wealthy peasants and landowners who are waiting for the market prices to rise still higher.

Barter is conducted on a big scale in the Tokyo valley between the well-to-do population of Tokyo and Yokohama and the prosperous sections of the population of villages situated in the vicinity of the large towns. Speculators are making huge profits. And in the meantime the workers in the cities and the majority of the peasants in the villages are starving.

Driving past the village of Torizawa one day we witnessed a scene that was extremely typical of rural life in Japan today. Two weary peasants with sun-parched faces harnessed to a wooden plough pushed from behind by a third were trudging laboriously over the field. That, no doubt, was how the land was cultivated five hundred years ago. That is how it is being cultivated today.

Feudal survivals still weigh heavily on the country's agriculture. And when this is combined with modern methods of capitalist exploitation, the result is that state of stagnation and regress which is characteristic of the Japanese village today. The two years that have elapsed since the surrender have brought about practically no changes.

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This is the view of those American business circles that do not approve of the reckless plans for world supremacy preached by the advocates of a new war. But whatever illusions Crum may have had on this score were exploded while the committee was still on its way to London by a landmine in the shape of a document distributed to its members on the Queen Elizabeth. It was marked:

"Contents of file of confidential communications on Palestine supplied by Division of Near Eastern Affairs (State Department) for use of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry." (P. 36.)

From these communications the members of the committee learned some astonishing things. The confidential documents revealed with cynical frankness the double-dealing of the State Department on the Palestine question.

"It revealed that steadily and successively we had made public promises to the Zionists and private promises to the Arabs." (P. 37.)

Every time a United States official spokesman had declared in favour of setting up a Jewish state in Palestine, the State Department promptly sent confidential messages to the Arab rulers explaining that the public statements meant nothing at all.

In October 1944 Roosevelt had sent a personal letter to Senator Wagner to be read before the Convention of the Zionist organizations of America. In his statement Roosevelt reiterated the plank of the Democratic Party adopted at its convention in that year proclaiming in favour of unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that country. Roosevelt promised that efforts would be made to effectuate this policy. But when the Prime Minister of Iraq requested an explanation from the State Department, the latter sent a secret cable assuring him that the President's statement referred to "possible action at some future date," and that Washington was "keeping in mind the assurance made to certain Near East governments" that nothing would be done without consultation with the Arabs.

On August 16, 1945, Truman had publicly stated that he had discussed the Palestine question with Churchill and Attlee at Potsdam, and that they had agreed to let as many Jews into Palestine as possible. But on October 23 the State Department sent a confidential cable to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut and Jidda, explaining that the American President and the

British Prime Minister had only "engaged in exploratory correspondence on this subject and naturally mentioned Palestine as one of the havens for homeless Jews," and that there had been no change in the American government's attitude on Palestine. Similar reassurances were given to the Arab world by the State Department on November 15, 1945.

Bartley Crum was thunderstruck by what he learned from these confidential documents.

"This file confirmed the charges of double-dealing that had been hurled at both the United States and Great Britain. It was a sorry and bitter record for an American to read." (P. 37.)

Crum suggested to the American members of the committee that as soon as the ship arrived in England they should return home. "I don't see that there is any purpose in going on with our work," he said.

Different, however, was the attitude of the British members of the committee. "I found it painful," is Crum's comment. Sir Frederick Leggett "was almost amused." Sir John Singleton said dryly: "It appears that Great Britain is not the only power who promises the same thing to two different groups." And Labour M. P. Richard Crossman remarked to Crum that though he could not understand the stupidity that would permit the Americans to do a thing like that, nevertheless "I must say it pleases me to find the British and the Americans are in the same boat."

None of the American members of the committee climbed out of this "boat" on reaching British shores. All that was left for Crum was to enter into his diary the melancholy reflection:

"The over-all question is whether the Western democracies have moral integrity. . . . If they don't, I think the Middle East may become a breeding place of new wars." (P. 44.)

\* \* \*

In London the committee was at once enveloped in a close web of police spying and surveillance. Crum begins his account of the committee's stay in England with the words: "Once in London I felt for the first time the strange sensation of being watched." Friends cautioned him to be careful to whom he spoke, and especially of what he said on the telephone: telephone conversations were being tapped and the American members of the committee were under surveillance. On his second day in London when Crum wanted to discuss certain ques-

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tions before the committee with a representative of a Jewish organization he preferred to meet him not in his hotel but "on a nearby corner." But even this meeting did not escape the British sleuths:

"The next morning one of my British colleagues met me with a smile. There was almost a chiding note in his voice. 'I understand you've been seeing some of our Jewish friends,' he said, and winked." (P. 46.)

To meet with people who wanted to convey information to Crum on Palestine matters he had to resort to complicated conspiratorial methods, about which he has many a colourful story to tell in his book.

In spite of British resistance the hearings of the committee in London were held in public.

"Public interest in the hearings seemed intense, as evidenced by the overflow attendance of spectators and the press gallery, which included nearly fifty reporters representing newspapers all over the world. But though I glanced through the London newspapers daily, I rarely found more than two or three paragraphs referring to our hearings and frequently nothing at all." (P. 48.)

Later Crum learned that "it was customary for the British Foreign Office to advise the press" on any matter it considered important. He thus received an object lesson in what the vaunted "freedom of the press" meant in Britain. His naive illusions were also soon to be shattered on another matter—the policy of the Labour Party.

At its annual conference in December 1944 this party had unequivocally declared in favour of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. What did the party intend to do about this pledge now that it was in power? This question was put at the committee's hearings to one of the Labour M.P.'s, Thomas Reid.

"Reid was forthright," Crum reports. "His party's pledges on Palestine had been highly overplayed, he told us." (P. 51.)

One of the British members of the committee, Wilfrid Crick, a banker, wanted to lend the tactless Labourite a helping hand. He asked him to explain to "our American friends" why the Labour Party, having come to power, could not consider itself bound by the decisions of its conferences and the pledges it had given the electors. He prompted Reid with a question:

"Would you agree that it is not entirely without precedent that political parties, when they are faced with the responsibility of government, do sometimes qualify the policies they have expressed?" (P. 52.)

But the reckless Labourite would not take the cautious hint. He answered bluntly:

"I am afraid it is worse than that. Sometimes political parties make promises which they do not at all carry out... I do not think the committee need pay an enormous amount of attention to vague resolutions passed at Labour Party conferences."

To which Crum comments:

"Since the British Labour Party was elected on the basis of such resolutions, this struck me as unalloyed political cynicism." (P. 52.)

At a formal luncheon tendered by Bevin to the members of the Committee, the British Foreign Secretary declared that the British government would accept all the Committee's recommendations. But, Crum writes:

"When I charged publicly that Bevin had made this promise, the British Foreign Office stated that it had no record of it. There may be no record, for the press was excluded, but many members of the British Cabinet were there and heard his words." (P. 61.)

At one of the dinners given the Committee before leaving England Crum gathered "what was in the mind" of some of his British colleagues. The British plan was quite simple. Let the Committee make whatever recommendations it wished. Let it even decide that 100,000 Jewish refugees should be enabled to enter Palestine. The reply would be: "Very well, that will require six divisions of soldiers. Will the American government provide three?" The Americans would say, "No," and Britain would then declare that she was not able to bear alone the burden of the consequences. And everything would remain as of old.

"Some of us considered it a trap," Crum writes.

\* \* \*

After visiting Western Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Egypt, the Committee proceeded to Palestine.

"If the atmosphere of intrigue and surveillance had been evident in London and Cairo, here it literally shouted at one," Crum says... "After two days in Jerusalem I felt like a character in a Hollywood mystery film." (Pp. 161-163.)

Special pill boxes had been installed above the entrance of the hotel where the Committee stayed and on the roofs of nearby buildings; the elevator and stair entrances were guarded day and night by British soldiers armed with submachine guns; the vicinity of the hotel was enveloped in barbed wire, with machine

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guns commanding all avenues of approach; tanks patrolled the street in front of the hotel. Agents of the British Criminal Investigation Department were assigned to each of the members of the Committee. When they went anywhere their cars were preceded by tanks equipped with mine detectors. The purpose of this display of military and police vigilance was clear:

"Every effort was made to impress upon us that we had come to a land on the brink of civil war between Jew and Arab." (P. 163.)

But in spite of all the exertions of the British authorities it became more and more evident to some of the American members of the Committee that Arab-Jewish enmity was artificially maintained only on the top levels, and that the masses of the two nationalities got on well together. Says Crum, summing up his impressions:

"The basic truth of Arab-Jewish life in Palestine is that political conflict on high levels does not affect the relations among the men on the street." (P. 229.)

Crum tried to ascertain on the spot how far the talk he had heard in London of the necessity of sending six divisions to Palestine was justified. He canvassed the opinion of no less a person than the British High Commissioner for Palestine, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham.

"I put a fundamental question frankly to him: would American troops be needed in Palestine if 100,000 Jews were admitted?"

"Sir Alan shot a sharp glance at me.

"No, sir," he said. "But I should not mind having a token squad of American troops here to show everyone that the United States is behind Britain in such a solution." (P. 225.)

\* \* \*

The last stage of the Committee's itinerary was Switzerland. Here, in Lausanne, on the peaceful shores of Lake Lemman, the Americans hoped to find surcease from spying and surveillance and to work in quiet on their "recommendations." But the tentacles of the British intelligence service reached out to them even in Switzerland. Captain Ayers, of the British Criminal Investigation Department, arrived specially for the purpose from Palestine. He would go through the rooms of the American delegates, and look through their papers. If anybody telephoned an American member of

the Committee he would find Captain Ayers at the end of the wire demanding who was calling and from where. The Americans' mail was opened. Even telegrams from President Truman to Judge Hutcheson, the American chairman of the Committee, were first delivered to the British consul in Geneva, and the Americans got them unsealed.

In Switzerland the Committee reviewed the results of its four months' investigation. The mountain gave birth to a mouse: the Committee rejected the proposal to create Jewish and Arab states in Palestine and recommended the continuation of the British mandate. It also declared in favour of admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. But this was categorically turned down by Attlee and Bevin. Crum puts the result in a nutshell:

"The fate of our Committee's recommendations is one of the scandals of this post-war period." (P. x.)

\* \* \*

Crum's book throws a certain light on the backstage aspects of Anglo-American diplomatic relations with regard to Palestine. True, the Palestine problem itself is presented in a narrow and distorted form. He practically does not touch upon its military-strategical side, and he has only a vague realization of the part played in it by oil. He hazards some absolutely incorrect opinions relative to the national problem in certain European countries. As to the situation in Palestine, he uncritically repeats the arguments of Zionists and is full of blind praise of their activity. Such superficial and incorrect views do not help a clear understanding of the Palestine problem, just as the timid recommendations of the Committee did not help its practical solution.

The appointment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was one of the first manifestations of that policy of ignoring and by-passing the United Nations which since the war has been pursued by Great Britain and the United States whenever they consider it to their advantage. Crum's account makes clear that both sides had weighty reasons to avoid putting the Palestine problem before the open forum of world opinion. But the attempt has been thwarted by stern realities. The recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee proved ineffective. Now, although belatedly, the Palestine problem has come before the United Nations.

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23 OCT

PALESTINE

Registry Number E9868/46/31.  
FROM P.O.  
No. Command.  
Dated  
Received in Registry 23 Oct-

Religious communities in Jerusalem.  
Memorandum memo on Religious communities in Jerusalem, indicating the problems involved in maintaining law and order.

Last Paper 9864

(Minutes.)

References

Useful for record  
U.N. (Pol.) Dept. JB out. 24

(Print)

Is it perhaps interest the UK Delegation?

(How disposed of)

S. Archbishop  
1/37  
Sent by c.o. J 14/11

(Action completed)

J.C.M. 20/11

(Index)

[Signature] 11/11/48

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Latin, the Armenian, the Copts, the Syrian Orthodox, the Abyssinian. Only the Greek Orthodox and Latin have any considerable number of Arab members.

In Jerusalem there are a large number of sacred sites and shrines revered by different Christian churches. The most important of these are the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, situated within the walled city of old Jerusalem, the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin Mary situated in the valley enclosed by the Garden of Gethsemane and the Place of Ascension on the Mount of Olives. In addition there is the Basilica of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, situated some seven kilometres south of Jerusalem.

In all of these shrines various churches of Christian Confessions and Faith have interests, the more complicated being the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity.

To deal with the less important sites first, i.e. the Virgin's Tomb and the Place of Ascension. The Virgin's Tomb is situated in a Christian Church built in the early twelfth century and now "owned" by the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians while the Copts and Syrian Orthodox have certain rights in it, the Latins (Roman Catholics) who probably originally owned and constructed the Church are now relegated to a small grotto situated in the hillside south of the church. Annually, religious services take place in this church which require the intervention of an independent body, the British District Commissioner, to ensure agreement as to timing and procedure.

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The Place of Ascension which is the traditional site from which Christ ascended to Heaven is now a Moslem Mosque; by custom the various Christian Churches, who have claims to the site, are permitted by the Moslems to celebrate their special services at their own Feasts of the Ascension. During these celebrations it is necessary for an administrative officer to be present supported by a number of British police in order to ensure that the arrangements already agreed to, are complied with. Occasions have arisen when one or other of the religious communities has perpetrated some new and novel proceedings in order to embarrass one of the other communities, such incidents having to be dealt with by the British District Commissioner at once, acting on his own authority.

In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which includes the site of the Crucifixion, the Tomb and site of the Resurrection of Our Lord together with a number of other less important sites, ownership and rights have been matters of dispute during the past seven hundred years. The Communities having principal claims are the Greek Orthodox, the Latins and the Armenians, the other interested communities being the Copts, the Syrian-Orthodox and the Abyssinians. At various times during the Christian era one or other of these communities has held important or dominatory position in relation to the others.

The present disputes arise mainly between the Latin and Eastern churches represented by the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians. It should be noted that there are Patriarchs in Jerusalem for each of these three Confessions. In the 18th century, the Latins supported by France, Spain and Italy

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obtained very considerable rights in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. The Greek Orthodox position, obtained with the support of Russia is based on Firmans granted by the Turks to the Orthodox Patriarchs in the middle of the nineteenth century. According to the mandate under which His Majesty's Government administers Palestine, the administration is responsible for maintaining the status quo in religious matters; it is the conditions which prevailed at the time of the military occupation of Palestine in 1918 which the administration now attempts to maintain as that status quo. In other words the conditions which prevail as a result of the Firman of the 19th century are not accepted willingly by the Latins who have the support of the Vatican in these matters.

On account of the confused state of affairs within the Church of the Holy Sepulchre an officer of the District Commissioner's Staff is detailed some two months before Easter in each year to work out programmes of procedure and timing. As the Latin Church follows the Gregorian calendar and the Eastern Church (Orthodox Armenians, Copts, Syrian and Abyssinians) follow the Julian calendar it is impossible to lay down any fixed procedure applicable to every year as in some years the Easters all come together and in other years there may be as much as four weeks interval between them. It is necessary during the whole of the Easter celebrations, regardless of which church or Confession is celebrating, for an administrative officer to be present supported by a sufficient force of police to ensure that the arrangements already agreed to are complied with and <sup>to prevent</sup> ~~there~~ any untoward incident which would result in a disturbance of the peace or a /desecration

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five

desecration of the Holy Places. 62

At Bethlehem the situation is not so complicated or involved as in the case of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre but there is dispute between the claims and rights of the various communities which require constant supervision and control. In this connection it should be noted that the Orthodox Christmas, which includes the Copts and Syrians (the Abyssinians have no rights at Bethlehem), is celebrated fourteen days after the Latin Christmas, and the Armenian Christmas is celebrated seven days after the Armenian New Year, which is celebrated fourteen days after the western New Year.

In addition to these periods of special celebrations there is ever present the risk of some innovation being introduced by the members of one Confession of Faith at the expense of the others. Only recently it was necessary for an administrative officer to intervene in a Latin Procession ascending Calvary by a route which the Orthodox claimed was contrary to the status quo.

It should be noted that for more than five hundred years the various religious bodies having interests in the Holy Sites in Palestine have been under the authority of an independent and foreign government.

In the case of the Christians no question of Arab or Jew arises. The outstanding disputes exist between ecclesiastical interests and claims of foreign states. It will be remembered that one of the incidents which led to the Crimean War was an attempt by the Imperial Government of Russia to  
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establish the right of controlling or restoring the Silver Star in the Church of the Nativity which marks the place of the birth of Christ.

Disputes at present exist between:

- (a) the Latins and Orthodox regarding Calvary, the Latin authorities relying on support from the Vatican, the Orthodox on the justice of the British Administration;
- (b) the Orthodox and the Armenians and the Latins in the Church of the Nativity;
- (c) the Copts and the Abyssinians regarding the section of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre known as Der es Sultan: in this case both parties to the dispute refer all matters to their respective governments.

One of the more important responsibilities of the British Administration in Jerusalem is the control and supervision of the pilgrims which flock to the Holy City in ever increasing numbers from foreign countries and from all parts of Palestine to attend the religious services of their respective churches.

The above notes may indicate to some extent the problems involved in maintaining law and order, peace and tranquility within those sites and shrines which are of such significance to the peoples of the Eastern and Western world.

+++

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 61792**

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<p>110 1947 31</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>E9899 /G 23 OCT 1947</p>
<p>E9899 /46/9 COS (4Y) 128<sup>th</sup> M19 Min 3 dated 15 OCT Received 23 OCT.</p>	<p>H.M.G.'s <u>policy in Palestine</u></p>	
<p>Last Paper E9856</p>	<p>(Minutes) See E9900 /46 /cr</p>	
<p>References</p>	<p>JB Oct. 27</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>See within 1. COS (4Y) 134<sup>th</sup> M19 Min 9</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p>31 OCT. JB NOV. 7</p>	
<p>(Action completed) 25/11</p>	<p>(Index) 4/11</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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References: **FO 371 / 61792**

27 OCT 1947

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1) S.L. Dept. Mtg. 2) Eastern Dept. 65

● Cos(67) 128<sup>H</sup> Mtg.

Oct. 15

E9899

23 OCT 1947

3. PALESTINE.

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute<sup>+</sup> by the Secretary reporting events and action taken on the previous day as a result of a telegram<sup>x</sup> from the Secretary of State for the Colonies on our intention to withdraw from Palestine if no solution was found agreeable to Jews and Arabs.

LORD MONTGOMERY said he agreed with the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, at Annex II to his minute. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff could offer no further advice until they had studied the reports being prepared by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and the Joint Planning Staff, referred to in paragraph 4 of the minute. He suggested that this should be made clear to the Foreign Office. He also suggested that the report being prepared by the Joint Planning Staff should include an assessment of the military implications which might follow our agreement to take part with other powers in imposing a sensible plan for the partition of Palestine which was generally acceptable to both Jews and Arabs.

*MW Johnson is amending point of mtg. in dis company with Hmd's statement*

In discussion the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, and expressed agreement with the views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Endorsed the brief submitted by the Secretary to the Minister of Defence, at Annex II to the Secretary's minute.
- (b) Agreed that no further advice could be submitted until the reports by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee and the Joint Planning Staff, outlined in paragraph 4 of the Secretary's minute, had been studied.
- (c) Instructed the Joint Planning Staff to include in their report their comments on the point referred to by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- (d) Instructed the Secretary to inform<sup>o</sup> the Foreign Office of the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

+ COS 1155/14/10/7.  
 x No. 2898  
 o Annex I.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61792



66

ANNEX I

Copy of a letter (reference C.O.S.1163/15/10/7) dated 15th October, 1947, from the Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Foreign Office.

x x x

The Minister of Defence, after his discussion with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the Cabinet yesterday, about the reply to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Palestine, said he would send to the Foreign Secretary, for his personal information, a copy of the Ministry of Defence brief on the subject. A copy of this note is attached.

The Chiefs of Staff this morning endorsed the substance of the brief and asked me to say that by Wednesday of next week they would be in a position to give their further views about the strategic implications of the evacuation of our forces from Palestine. At present, the Principal Administrative Officers and the Joint Planning Staff are hard at it in covering the various questions raised by the Foreign Office. Until they receive these reports, the Chiefs of Staff do not wish to say anything further at the present time.

x x x

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61792**





	Palestine	E9900/G
	EASTERN	

121  
31  
E9900/46 10  
c/c Stapleton  
4/Def  
to Mr Dixon  
COS 1163/15/10/7  
dated 15 Oct  
Received 23 Oct.

Strategic implications of  
evacuation of forces from  
Palestine

Last Paper  
E9899

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
DF 6/11	WJA.

Next Paper

(Minutes)

Of the three conclusions in para. 7  
The brief (a) is self-evident  
(b) is negative and (c) is dangerous.  
As regards (c) we are taking  
particular care not to be  
involved in a repetition of  
our year-long endeavours to find  
a settlement. <sup>perhaps</sup> The ~~main~~ <sup>main</sup> point  
of our decision to withdraw is  
to regain our freedom of manoeuvre  
and bring the two sides to  
negotiate. We must be very  
careful about involving ourselves  
in negotiations to amend the  
partition plans.

Servies Liaison Dept. *[Signature]*  
34092

*[Signature]* Oct. 27/47

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Reference: FO 371 / 61792







Tel. No. : Whitehall 7000

TOP SECRET

*S.S.*

*Eastern Dep't*

*16/10*

*E9900*

*E*

*center*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

GREAT GEORGE STREET

S.W.1

15th October, 1947

*70*

*Dear Dixon*

The Minister of Defence, after his discussion with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the Cabinet yesterday, about the reply to the secretary of State for the Colonies on Palestine, said he would send to the Foreign Secretary, for his personal information, a copy of the Ministry of Defence brief on the subject. A copy of this note is attached.

The Chiefs of Staff this morning endorsed the substance of the brief and asked me to say that by Wednesday of next week they would be in a position to give their further views about the strategic implications of the evacuation of our forces from Palestine. At present, the Principal Administrative Officers and the Joint Planning Staff are hard at it in covering the various questions raised by the Foreign Office. Until they receive these reports, the Chiefs of Staff do not wish to say anything further at the present time.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*Yours sincerely*

*[Handwritten signature]*

P.J. Dixon, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

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Reference:

**FO**

**371**

**61792**

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72

U.K. Contribution to the Solution

4. The Americans and the Russians have said that they favour partition in principle. The Jews accept it and the Arabs are bitterly opposed to it and must now realise that any modifications to the present plan can only be achieved with our assistance. If we fail to exercise our influence at least as far as it is possible to go in achieving acquiescence between the two parties, we stand to lose our strategic and economic assets in the Arab World. Surely here is our chance to put forward some modification to the scheme of partition which, without causing the Jews to withdraw their acceptance, might bring the Arabs to acquiescence. We might then retain our political, economic and strategic position in Palestine and keep the Russians out.

5. The consequences of alienating the Arab World do of course extend beyond the future of Palestine into the whole scheme of Commonwealth Defence.

Subsidiary Points

6. (a) The possibility of our withdrawing to the fringe of Palestine, e.g. in the Negeb area, is ruled out because of geographical conditions.

(b) Lasting hostility from the Arab World will gravely prejudice our chances of a firm hold on the Middle East because it is unlikely that we shall gain any strategic facilities from any of the Arab States, or their support for our claim to Cyrenaica.

(c) Unless we hand over to a competent authority properly supported by security forces, we stand to lose our economic and strategic facilities in Palestine.

7. To sum up, I suggest:-

(a) You support the idea of re-emphasizing our determination to withdraw.

(b) You strongly oppose the mention of a date for withdrawal at this stage.

(c) You advocate that we should use our influence to modify the partition plans in such a way as to bring the greatest measure of acquiescence between the Arabs and Jews as possible.

(Sg!) D. C. STABLETON

I must also mention that before a decision is taken - if only the delay is by tomorrow - the Chiefs of Staff should be given the opportunity to tender their advice.

14th October, 1947

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... *FO* .....

Class ..... *371* .....

Piece ..... *61792* .....

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Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

*E9902/46/31*

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Reference:

**FO** *371* / *61792*



Palestine

E9908 / G B

EASTERN

122 31  
E9908 / 46 / C

Palestine: Proposals for Conciliation

New York  
3018

Dated 22 Oct  
Received 23 Oct

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

E9900

References.

It is suggested that this telegram should be repeated to the Arab posts and to Jerusalem for the personal information of our representatives and the High Commissioner. They should clearly be informed of what is going on so that they may take a suitable line if questioned. The matter should, however, be treated as very secret at this stage. I submit a draft telegram.

The scheme described is in keeping with Mr. Beeley's thesis that it is now our policy to bring the Americans (as representing the main strength behind the Jews) into direct negotiations with the Arabs. Thus the two forces, which have up till now made it impossible for us to find a settlement, will be brought into direct contact and we shall no longer be in the thankless role of intermediary.

It seems evident from para.6 of this telegram that we would on balance have preferred to launch this attempt at a later date. It has not, however, been possible to hold it up and the matter is now in the hands of Mr. Wadsworth (lately U.S. Minister in Beirut and now U.S. Ambassador at Baghdad). Mr. Wadsworth is well known for his pro-Arab views, but I think he may find it difficult, in view of the present stand of the U.S. in favour of the Majority Plan for partition, to "sell" the idea to U.S. Officials and Politicians.

This telegram is being distributed in the usual way to the Colonial Office, the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry.

J.G.S. Beith

(J.G.S. Beith)  
24th October, 1947.

NO this minute was written before seeing the attached minute by SIS. JB.

Next Paper.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61792

(How disposed of.)

8) W.O.  
Adly  
A.H.  
C.O.  
CAB 24 Oct

Tel Cairo 1982  
Bagdad 925  
Jedda 440  
Amman 469  
Beirut 663  
Damascus 346

RPO New York 3607  
W/O 11063

(Action completed.)

25/10

74

We have the dilemma that if action is taken on these lines now the Jews will be intransigent because they hope the Assembly will back partition. If we wait till after the Assembly either the Jews will have got what they wanted, & so will be still more intransigent, or there will have been no decision, & then the Arabs will be intransigent.

I have added to the draft etc.

B.A.S. + now

I agree that our press need some guidance & that it is suggested they should say, if tackled, seems the safest & the best we can do without appearing to be against all attempts at conciliation.

C.A. Warner  
24/10.

Seen by Sir O. Sargent.  
Fol. sent.

B.A.S.

25. x

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Reference: FO 371 / 61792



E9908/46/C

C.M.S.V. 1947

Minutes.

*Put with 75*

*E.g. →*

I have only just seen telegram No.3018 of October 22nd from New York upon which Kirkbride comments in his telegram No. 322 of 30th October. It is impossible to reject out of hand the opinion of anyone so experienced as Kirkbride or to forget Nuri's passion for intrigue. At the same time there are two or three points which I think must be taken into consideration before this plan is written off as useless. They are:-

- (a) The initiative <sup>did</sup> would not come from Nuri himself.
- (b) I am convinced that he is both sincere in his desire to see the Palestine question settled in a way not too contrary to Arab hopes and also that he rejected the Mufti as hopelessly uncompromising long ago.
- (c) He knows that King Abdullah is not popular in several of the Arab countries and told me himself some months ago that he found the Regent of Iraq very difficult to interest for long in any serious project.

2. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the qualifications of King Ibn Saud as a spokesman for the Arab point of view and, although Sir A. Kirkbride ~~really~~ suggests that the spotlight would fall on the "Saudists", I cannot see that his choice could have fallen on any other leader or that he could have effectively eliminated the Mufti's influence by any other acceptable device.

*K.C. Buss*  
K.C. Buss

3rd November, 1947.

Mr. Burrows, Eastern Dept.

*Mr. G. ...*  
*11/47*

*J.B. M.V. 7*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61792**

Eastern Dept.

To see 4/6's minute:

76

"I believe this is bound to fail.  
The Jews will become more exacting,  
but I do not intend to interfere."  
EB

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3018 D. 1.57 p.m. 22nd October 1947  
R. 10.10 p.m. 22nd October 1947  
22nd October 1947

Repeated to Washington

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Following for Burrows from Beeley.

Palestine:

At a recent meeting of Commonwealth delegates on the subject of Palestine Dr. Evatt enquired which of the Arab delegates would be most ready to consider proposals for conciliation. Nuri Pasha was suggested. Man [sic] and I have since heard from Nuri himself that he was approached by Evatt with the suggestion that a sub-Committee of the Palestine Committee should be formed to explore the possibility of conciliation.

2. Nuri welcomed this suggestion, which has also been discussed by Evatt with the Turkish Delegation and apparently with some others. He thinks however, that nothing can come of it because - apart from probable Jewish obstinacy - the Arab Delegations here would be bound to take instructions from home which would mean that the decisive influence on their attitude would lie with the Mufti of Jerusalem. Nuri has therefore been trying to think of some way of eliminating the Mufti's influence so that on the Arab side at least a measure of compromise would become a possibility. He has now hit upon the following idea which has also been expounded to us - at a separate and earlier interview - by Hafiz Wahba.

3. The idea is that an attempt at joint arbitration should be made by Ibn Saud in person together with a representative of United States Government. The other Arab States would bind themselves in advance to accept any award agreed upon by the two principals. It would then be impossible for the Mufti to resist it effectively. The meeting should take place in Jedda or Riyadh.

4. Having worked out this plan Nuri first approached Feisal who asked for time to consider it and to refer to his father. On 19th October Feisal informed Nuri that the plan was acceptable adding, however, that it would be well for the King to have advisers from the other Arab States in attendance during the talks. This would make it easier for / him....

*I believe this is bound to fail. The Jews will become more exacting, but I do not intend to interfere. EB*

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77

him to go to the limit of reasonable concessions.

5. Nuri thereupon approached the Heads of the other Arab Delegations and Jamal Husseini all of whom gave their approval to the plan. The way was thus clear for an approach to the Americans.

6. Before formally discussing the proposal with the Americans which he hoped to do at a very high level Nuri wished us to take some preliminary soundings and let him know what the chances appeared to be. I suggested that the Americans having committed themselves so outspokenly to the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority plan might find it difficult to engage now in discussions obviously directed towards a different solution and that the time for Arab-American conversations might not come until it was clear that the Assembly could provide no effective settlement of the problem. To this Nuri replied that if the Assembly failed to solve the problem Arab spirits would at once rise and it would become more difficult for Ibn Saud to make adequate concessions. In any case nothing could be lost by making an attempt now. His Majesty's Government would surely be pleased if a settlement could be arrived at in the way he suggested. I agreed and promised to pass on what he had told me to the State Department.

7. I have accordingly given the story to Wadsworth of the United States Delegation who will keep me informed of developments.

8. Neither Nuri nor Sheikh Hafiz indicated the basis on which they thought an agreed settlement was possible. I learn from another source however that Faris Bey is speaking of cantonisation as an acceptable solution and this fits in with the report in Beirut telegram No. 756 to Foreign Office that Azzam thinks the Arabs might now accept something on the lines of the Moohsapison plan.

9. Please inform Colonial Office.

[Copy sent to Mr. Burrows]

ccc

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E9908

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3018

D. 1.57 p.m. 22nd October 1947  
R. 10.10 p.m. 22nd October 1947

22nd October 1947

Repeated to Washington

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Following for Burrows from Beeley.

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Registry  
No. *E9906/4619*

IMPORTANT.

*80*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
Confidential  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

JGSB

F. O.,

24th October 1947.

IMPORTANT  
CONFIDENTIAL Despatched

M.

Draft.

Cairo *1982*  
Bagdad *985*  
Jedda *440*  
Amman *469*  
Beirut *663*  
Telegram. Damascus *546*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Palestine.

No. ....  
(Date) *Oct 25*

Repeat to :-

U. K. Delegation  
New York  
Washington *11069*  
Jerusalem

I am repeating to you for your personal and top secret information New York Telegram No. 3018, regarding a scheme for direct negotiations ~~discussions~~ between Arab representatives, headed by Ibn Saud, and U.S. representatives ~~in regard to Palestine.~~ You should be aware of the situation in case any repercussions may reach you, but the subject matter should be treated as top secret.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*J.S. Beirut*  
*Oct. 24*

~~En Clair.~~  
Code.  
Cypher.

Distribution :-  
Departmental No. *1.*  
Palestine  
Distribution.  
*Dip. Secret*

Copies to :-

*C.O.*  
*W.O.*  
*A.M.*  
*CRAS*  
*24/10*

*2. The scheme is an interesting one, though it will be difficult to find a moment at which both Jews & Arabs are ready to make any appreciable concessions. I think it will be best for HMG not to become directly associated with the scheme for the time being. If asked for your advice on it you should say that HMG welcome any move designed to improve the chances of an agreed*

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E9908/46/G  
Confidential  
Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES AT

<u>CAIRO</u>	<u>No. 1982</u>
<u>BAGDAD</u>	<u>No. 925</u>
<u>JEDDA</u>	<u>No. 440</u>
<u>AMMAN</u>	<u>No. 469</u>
<u>BEIRUT</u>	<u>No. 663</u>
<u>DAMASCUS</u>	<u>No. 546</u>

October 25th, 1947.

D. 5.25 a.m. October 26th,  
1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3656,  
Washington No. 11068 and Jerusalem

IMPORTANT  
CONFIDENTIAL

Palestine.

I am repeating to you for your personal and top secret information New York telegram No. 3018. You should be aware of the situation in case any repercussions may reach you, but the subject matter should be treated as top secret.

2. The scheme is an interesting one, though it will be difficult to find a moment at which both Jews and Arabs are ready to make any appreciable concessions. It will be best for His Majesty's Government not to become directly associated with the scheme for the time being. If asked for your advice on it you should say that His Majesty's Government welcome any move designed to improve the chances of an agreed settlement, though they are not themselves at present committed to any particular means of doing so.

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Reference

FO 371 / 61792

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83

		Palestine		E9928 / G	
123 127 31		EASTERN			
E 9928 / 46 / c1		Meeting of Palestine Committee on 21 Oct.			
New York 3021					
Dated 22 Oct					
Received 24 Oct					
Last Paper. E9928		(Minutes.) See E9903 and minute 10 Oct. 24			
References. E9865 / 95 / 31 E9780 / 95 / 31					
(Print.)					
(How disposed of.) to Mr. Pumphrey No 10 from Mr. Dixon 24 Oct					
(Action completed.) AF 20 / 10	(Index.) WPK				
Next Paper.					

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Reference: FO 371 / 61792					

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Cypher/OTP.

E9928  
P R I S E C.

85

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE, 24 OCT 1947

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3021. D. 6.18 p.m. 22nd October 1947.

22nd October 1947. R. 1.24 a.m. 23rd October 1947.

Repeated to: Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

PERSONAL.

Following for Secretary of State from  
Colonial Secretary.

[Begins]

The Palestine Committee met yesterday and today and had before it all the proposals which emerged from the general discussion and were embodied in my earlier telegrams Nos. 2985 and 2992. The Russians wanted to pass immediately to acceptance of principle of partition but this suggestion was defeated and Evatt with overwhelming support insisted that Committee should appoint a sub-committee of persons sympathetic to partition to submit a scheme within eight days. This sub-committee would consider boundaries and other adjustments and such matters as immigration, substitute authority for Palestine and implementation so that full Committee may know with more precision what it would be asked to vote on and have full realisation of what is involved by their vote. At same time a second sub-committee would study the Arab proposals for a similar purpose. There would be a conciliation sub-committee as well available throughout the rest of the Committee's work to reduce area of disagreement between Jews and Arabs and bring them to common ground if possible.

2. Though present I have not contributed to these discussions because I felt that the United Nations should feel its own way to methods of procedure for reaching a solution; but weighing up situation here I thought Evatt's line the wiser way of bringing Committee to face realistically the problem of partition. At this stage I think we should not get involved in procedural matters. We had better keep our freedom until the United Nations has reached some tentative conclusions by not committing ourselves to one scheme or another and by not serving as members of the sub-committees. I have offered all the experience and knowledge we possess for the use of the sub-committees and we shall be ready to sit with them and give information and, for example, indicate difficulties involved in particular proposals.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61792

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3. We cannot deal with our Displaced Persons Resolution till next week but sub-committees are of course quite free to make recommendations on this topic for consideration by the full Committee.

[Ends].

W:W:Y:W:W

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61792**





90

P.D.

NEW YORK.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

No.....

Cypher

Date.....

Diplomatic Secret.

For concurrence  
of Prime Minister.

Your telegram No.3003 [of October 21st:  
Colonial Secretary and Palestine]

Personal for Colonial Secretary from  
the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

We fully realise what a number of tasks  
are awaiting you at home and how inconvenient  
it is for you to be away. We are not clear  
from your telegrams Nos. 3021 and 3031 when  
the question of principle will come up, but  
gather that matters are not likely to come to a  
head just yet. We therefore feel that you  
should be free to come home whenever you  
judge the moment opportune. You will no  
doubt determine your actual date of departure  
in the light of developments of the Palestine  
situation which you are much better able to  
assess than ourselves.

2. We should like to know whether in  
your absence Cadogan will be in charge of the  
Palestine question.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61792**



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E 9967 91

1947

PALESTINE

25 OCT

Registry Number

E 9967/46/31

TELEGRAM FROM

W. H. H. H.

No.

Received

Dated

Received in Registry

466  
23 Oct  
25 -

Syria - Political - President  
Re: Damascus Tel 85 to Jerusalem (E 9967/46/31)  
Notes of Report stated Syrian President  
was very much pleased with the communique  
which had been received yesterday concerning  
peace in the East, which in his opinion  
had said exactly the right things.

ADDRESS TO JERUSALEM 88.

(Minutes.)

*[Signature]*  
27/10

Last Paper.

9928

References.

This incident is now satisfactorily  
settled. The Syrians were  
given bulk some days ago  
but the He. has only just  
told the Co.

*[Signature]*  
Oct. 27

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. *[Signature]* 60  
Oct 28

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*  
46/28/10

(Index.)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

E 9974

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	1	1	1	1

Reference: FO 371 / 61792

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 9974

Mr. Dundas  
No. 464

D. 6.10 p.m. 25th October, 1947.

23rd October, 1947.

R. 7.44 p.m. 23rd October, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem  
Beirut

CONFIDENTIAL

Jerusalem telegram No. 1449 to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Frontier incidents.

All incidents have now been settled and everyone is [gp. undec. ? content] again. I fully share the High Commissioner's view that there is a danger that the incidents may be exaggerated in the press and I have done my best to ensure that they should be treated by everyone here as mistakes having no political significance.

2. The Head of Political Section, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has today given me a list of complaints as to Jewish action in the neighbourhood of the Syrian frontier which his Government considers provocative. None of them are of importance.

3. I pointed out that Syrian manoeuvres had obviously resulted in an increased determination on the part of the Jews to be ready to defend themselves if attacked; but that as long as we remained responsible for the administration of Palestine we would ensure that there was no threat to Syria from the inhabitants of Palestine.

4. Until British Forces withdrew from Syria information was exchanged between Syrian army and British military authorities in Palestine on the position of military frontier posts and I understand similar information is still exchanged between the two police forces.

5. If you and the High Commissioner see no objection I would ask the Syrian Minister of Defence informally whether he would agree to the Commander of the North Legion keeping in touch with the British Commander in North Palestine and exchanging information through their respective staffs concerning the positioning of posts in the frontier area, with a view to co-ordination of efforts to prevent smuggling and illegal crossings of the frontier. Such co-operation might lead to the withdrawal of redundant posts and would, I believe, materially decrease the risk of frontier incidents.

Repeated to Beirut as my telegram No. 530.

MM

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75

Palestine

EASTERN

9977  
E ~~9962~~ /G

124 31

~~E 9962~~ /46/C  
9977

New York  
3062

Dated 24 Oct  
Received 25 Oct.

Palestine: Proposed meeting  
with U.S. delegation.

Last Paper.  
E9928

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)  
Mr. Dixon tells me that, in view of this  
disagreement, the S.F.S. is anxious for Mr. *Rable*  
Green-Gomes to return as soon as possible  
and a telegram has been sent to that effect. (S-CABLE) 25/10  
*Dept.*

*Mr Douglas has now seen the S.F.S.*

*RD*  
*307*

(Action completed.)  
25/11

(Index.)  
*12/11*

Next Paper.

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1	2	3	4	5	6

References: **FO 371 / 61792**











4977  
~~EQ95~~ 98  
23 OCT 1947  
EUI

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3062. D. 12.12. a.m. October 25th, 1947.  
October 24th, 1947. R. 6.32. a.m. October 25th, 1947.

Repeated to Washington.

IMMEDIATE.

LIGHT.

TOP SECRET.

Following for Secretary of State from Minister of State.

Palestine.

We have been trying, before Sub-Committee 1 of the Palestine Committee proceeds any farther, to arrange a meeting with the United States delegation. They inform us however, that Douglas is being sent to London to try to develop the United States viewpoint with you. They feel that there would be little advantage in discussions here until after your exchange of views with Douglas.

2. I do not know what Douglas will propose. United States delegation here express anxiety at the tendency of our two Governments towards opposite conclusions on this question.

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